Further to my comments in The Royal Gazette’s November 2, 2026 edition, the ruling on Progressive Labour Party membership has engendered “knock on” effects and stands as a watershed, a platform and a launching pad for a more modern PLP constitution to reflect the reality of the times, and the astute and growing politicisation of its members and supporters.

In many ways the political and social awareness of the PLP’s base has outstripped its leadership — and that’s a good thing. That base will keep the leadership on its toes in gaining and remaining progressive in its policies and programmes going forward.

Ascertaining whether the constitution of an organisation is fit for purpose, and the membership of that organisation understands that to be the case, is the sole duty and responsibility of the hierarchy or leadership of that particular organisation.

That is so, of course, if and only if the “leadership” itself is sufficiently educated about how its constitution actually works, or should work, equitably for every member of that organisation. No one, bar none, is above that organisation’s constitution. At no time can or should any constitution be the tool or plaything of the few to arbitrarily or capriciously rule over the many, as or when they conveniently see fit to do so. That constitution must be revered and respected at all times. It is, or should be “the unmuted voice of the people, or its membership”, and how they wish to be governed. Constitutions should exemplify “participatory democracy” at its finest.

Some inevitable amendments

To that end, today’s iteration of the PLP constitution, last revised or ratified, such as it was, on January 29, 2021 is long overdue for progressive amendments.

In that regard, the ruling must be appreciated as a blessing in disguise in that many positive lessons, and teachable moments, may be gleaned and put to good use from such a ruling. Lessons and teachable moments that may be shared and learnt as well by other political parties such as the One Bermuda Alliance and Free Democratic Movement, the former of which is managed largely as a top-down, autocratic corporation.

Such corporate models are woefully out of alignment with today’s liberal and expansive democracies, which, much like the PLP, in some aspects, lean far more towards “socially based” infrastructures and administration.

Upon examination, the OBA constitution, apart from other anachronisms, is far more authoritarian, even dictatorial, than the PLP constitution. As with the PLP, the OBA must decentralise and distribute power more widely among its central organs and particularly its branches. Such democratisation will pull power away from the potential of the tyrannical, even whimsical wielding of power of “the few over the many”, as is the case in both the PLP and the OBA.

To be frank, that is precisely the reason the unconstitutional usage, procedurally and substantively, of the organ of the central committee, instead of the more appropriate organ of a special delegates conference of the PLP, fell into error in its attempt to pass the highly controversial August 24, 2026 motions through that organ. A more “constitutionally” alert, or savvy central committee, may well have successfully resisted the pressures of an executive leadership, and the unfortunate subsequent circumstance of a court venue, to resolve the ensuing disputes which remain with us today.

An independent disputes panel

Accordingly, and to avoid or mitigate any such future “trips to court”; I am suggesting that the following “amendments” of the PLP’s constitution be seriously considered, or at least tabled, at the reconvening of its next Annual General Conference to be held sometime on or before January 27, 2027.

I am suggesting that in order to keep, as much as it is possible in such a small community, disputes of the nature of which we have witnessed of late within the four walls of an organisation, PLP or OBA, these organisations should create or modify an existing organ within its infrastructure into an independent disputes resolution tribunal or panel to determine such matters, constitutional or non-constitutional. Other organisations, the Bar Council among lawyers, for example, does so in disciplinary matters in particular.

Annual general conferences of the PLP ought to be strictly open to all financial members for the election of the hierarchy of the PLP. Elected delegates, if they are to exist at all, ought to be reserved for emergency matters, to be firstly heard before a special delegates conference or meeting, before, or if, they are to be subsequently passed on to an independent disputes resolution tribunal or panel for a final or binding disposition.

Only matters likely to be in breach of Bermuda’s Constitutional Order 1968 ought to be referred by the PLP itself to the Supreme Court for determination as a non-adversarial case or issue stated. That determination will settle the matter, and finally bind all parties in dispute, who will be neither plaintiff or defendant. All costs of such proceedings are to be covered by the party as a whole, as it is that organisation that will benefit one way or the other by or from such a decision.

An amended central committee

Additionally, by way of progressive amendments to the relevant provisions of the PLP constitution, the next annual general conference may wish to assess the wisdom or fairness of having the executive, which comprises approximately 12 party officers, also being members of the central committee. This constitution, apart from making the central committee an unwieldy body, disadvantageously gives tremendous power over that committee to the executive members who not only put plans of action before the CC, but also vote for and/or approve such plans. The party leader and deputy party leader are members of both the executive and the CC. That’s a formidable, even forbidding, concentration of “power” over the organisation.

Finally, it is my view that the PLP’s disciplinary regime must be closely examined, or amended, to ensure that such a regime is not designed for, or being used to, intimidate or dissuade well meaning “change agents” from making progressive suggestions for the party machinery. Such a regime should only and truly be deployed, after reasonable or probable cause has been established by the CC, to discipline allegedly genuine “wrongdoers”.

Strong, vibrant, dynamic and fair constitutions are made by strong, vibrant, free and fair-minded persons or the membership.

Let’s hope that the PLP’s reconvened 2026 Annual General Conference ushers in not only a new year, but heralding a new era of democratic reform throughout the PLP’s constitution.

Let’s further hope that such democratic fervour generalises to other organisations as well, and Bermudian society altogether.

As the saying goes, hope springs eternal.

• Phil Perinchief is a former attorney-general and Progressive Labour Party senator