The following is a speech delivered by Mr. Peter Lloyd, a former deputy governor of Bermuda and onetime governor of the Cayman Islands, to the Bermuda Industrial Union's Forum on Independence on May 1.

I was grateful for the invitation to speak to you about Independence, knowing how many Bermudians are anxious to learn more about this subject and believing that it is a subject which should be given very careful thought.

Let me, first, explain where I am coming from.

I have lived in Bermuda, on and off, for rather more than 15 years. And I have been married for more than twice as long as that to a Bermudian whose ancestors came here early in the seventeenth century; we celebrated our 38th wedding anniversary a few days ago. But I am not myself a Bermudian. I have never applied for status. Nor have I ever been registered as an elector here.

So I shall not have a vote when the referendum takes place; which will at least mean that I shall not have to decide whether to abstain! I do not say this by way of complaint. It is by my own choice that I have remained in effect a guest in your country. As a guest it is not my place to lecture my hosts about whether they should be seeking Independence. So I do not propose to argue either for or against it.

Perhaps I should add that I am anyway ambivalent about the subject. On the one hand, I spent much of my working life helping some former colonies to achieve Independence. I can therefore understand why it has such a powerful attraction for many people. On the other hand, against this background, it has always been a particular sadness for me when Independence has proved a disappointment, or even a disaster, for some countries.

And, believe me, it has. There are now military dictatorships in several. In others there are one-party states where opponents of the party may be detained without trail. Elsewhere corrupt politicians have become multi-millionaires whilst there has been massive unemployment amongst the ordinary population.

Be suspicious if you are told that this is a myth, or that even if it happened it wasn't because the countries' leaders were corrupted by power: the chances are that anyone telling you that has some ulterior motive.

Be equally suspicious of those who seek to tell you that the same thing would inevitably happen here if Bermuda went independent. That is nonsense. For circumstances here differ in many respects from those of other former colonies. These islands are far more prosperous. They have far longer experience of parliamentary government. They have a better educated electorate. And so on.

But bear in mind the risk that things might go wrong even here. Because they might, careful thought should be given to the need for safeguards against this happening.

If you are doubtful, let me invite you to consider two points.

First, the two main political parties here have never yet managed to co-operate even about things which are patently issues of national concern, like drug trafficking and abuse. I do not say this in criticism of either of them, still less to apportion blame for an unhappy state of affairs. I say it because it shows how suspicious they are of one another.

With so much suspicion you may think it must follow that neither party can be expected to trust the other not to abuse power in the event of Independence.

And, it you think that, you may agree, no matter which party you personally support, that watertight safeguards against abuse are desirable.

Second, we all know how important international business has become to Bermuda. And we have all heard that such business may flee overnight from an unstable country. There may at times seem to be an element of scaremongering in what we hear. But there is an element of truth in it too. So that is another good reason -- of special importance in the circumstances of Bermuda -- to devise safeguards which are anyway desirable.

What do we need to safeguard? Probably: Democratic institutions; The rule of law; and, The independence of the public service generally, and of the judiciary in particular.

How are they safeguarded now? The United Kingdom is still ultimately responsible for the good government of Bermuda and could therefore be expected to intervene if anybody here attempted to abuse their powers in a manner which threatened democratic institutions.

And the Governor has a wide range of responsibilities additional to those for foreign affairs and defence. They include responsibility for judicial appointments.

An Independence Constitution would have to provide for someone else to have all these responsibilities. So the question is, who should be given them? Many provisions, covering many different matters, would be necessary. Some of the matters concerned are of great importance. I propose to examine three.

The first is the Privy Council. There is widespread agreement not only that provision for appeals to its Judicial Committee should be retained, but also that such provision should be entrenched, or even specially entrenched, in an Independence Constitution. The purpose of any form of entrenchment would be to safeguard against a future government arbitrarily removing the right to such appeals -- as some governments have done.

A provision which is entrenched is more difficult to amend than the rest of the Constitution. And a specially entrenched provision is more difficult still.

But just how difficult would, or should, it be to amend such provisions? There is a wide range of possibilities. For instance, it could be provided that the need was for: a two-thirds majority of both houses; a three-quarters majority of both houses; a majority in a public referendum as well as some parliamentary majority; a majority not just of those who vote in any referendum, but of the total electorate; a period of delay from the date when a proposed amendment is first introduced into parliament until the date when it may be made -- to allow time for public reflection and debate; and perhaps for various combinations of these things.

So a decision to entrench is not enough. It is necessary to consider just what provisions shall be made. And there are enough possibilities for this to be a complex issue which warrants careful study. Study, for instance, not only of what was provided in other countries' Constitutions, but also of how satisfactory each proved. Study, too, perhaps, of the opinions of those (like international business) whom the provisions are intended to reassure.

The second matter for examination is that of judicial appointments. Most of these are now made by the Governor, in some cases after specified consultation. But even when he is required to consult, the final decision is his. So Judges and Justices of Appeal are selected in a way which insulates them from even the appearance of being obligated to one political party or another.

In most countries in the Commonwealth there are -- or at least were at the time of Independence -- legal and judicial service commissions which have constitutional responsibility for making appointments to most judicial and senior legal offices. The commissions have always been intended to continue insulating these offices from politics.

My understanding is that there is general agreement that provision should be made in an Independence Constitution for one to be established here. That is certainly welcome. But experience elsewhere has shown that such commissions will only provide satisfactory insulation if their own members are insulated from politics too. In cases in which provision is made in Constitutions for some of the members to be appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, it has too often happened that Prime Ministers have advised the appointment of their political cronies.

It is perfectly true that, where provision is made for members to be appointed on the advice of a Prime Minister, Constitutions usually also provide that Prime Minister shall consult the Opposition Leader before advising. But the present Constitution of Bermuda contains a provision of a similar kind in respect of the appointment of the Chief Justice; and Mr. Wade is on record as considering it worthless, because no notice was in his view ever taken of the opinions he expressed when consulted. You may think that, if it has been regarded as worthless in the past, there are no grounds for expecting it to become any more useful as a safeguard in the future.

I do not know of any easy solution to this problem of who should appoint the members of a judicial and legal services commission. Indeed there may be no altogether satisfactory solution to it. But I do at least want to suggest that, like the issue of just what procedure should be followed to amend entrenched provisions, the problem warrants very painstaking study.

Moreover a series of related questions should be studied too: What security of tenure should justices of appeal and judges have? What provisions should be made for removing them from office? For what period should they be appointed? Even if they are normally appointed to serve until they reach some prescribed age, what about acting appointments? And when an expatriate has to be appointed as a judge for lack of a suitable Bermudians candidate, should his appointment be for a limited period in case a suitable Bermudian is found? Who is to decide whether the Bermudian is in fact suitable? Should whatever provisions are made about all these matters be entrenched in an Independence Constitution? Or specially entrenched? The third matter for examination -- the most difficult and controversial of all -- is the electoral system.

Under the present system here there are more voters in some constituencies than in others. So it is quite rightly said that the system does not provide for "one person, one vote, one value''. Some of those who say this go on to imply that the system must therefore be outrageously unfair.

Most of that sort of criticism is based on misunderstanding -- or even deliberate distortion -- of the facts. For the truth is that there is no evidence that the disparity in constituency sizes here has given one political party an advantage over the other. Moreover, far from Bermuda being unusual is having any disparity at all, its disparity is far smaller than is common elsewhere. The figure here is just over two to one. The latest figure I have seen for the United Kingdom was about six to one. And many countries have even higher figures than that.

Nevertheless any disparity must surely be undesirable in principle. And it must be all the more undesirable if many Bermudians believe, however mistakenly, that the present system is biased. So there seems a good case for examining alternatives.

My understanding is that the PLP's preferred alternative has long been single-seat constituencies with (as nearly as possible) equal numbers of voters in each. That sounds an ideal arrangement. But, with respect, I foresee two snags.

Both would arise when the new constituency boundaries had to be decided. One would be the risk of gerrymandering then -- that is, of deliberately so fixing boundaries as to give one party an advantage over the other. And, make no mistake, very substantial advantages indeed could be given if those who fixed the boundaries were not wholly impartial.

There have been occasional allegations of gerrymandering in the past, despite the fact that the present Constitution does not empower the Constituency Boundaries Commission to recommend anything more than quite minor boundary changes. If in future its task was far more controversial, the allegations could become far more serious.

The second snag concerns the future membership of the Commission itself. At present it has two members appointed on the advice of the Premier, two appointed on the advice of the Opposition Leader, and a Chairman and a judicial member appointed by the Governor in his discretion. So the Chairman and the judicial member -- who should both be impartial -- hold the balance.

Who would hold it after Independence? Given the sensitive nature of the Commission's task, and the potential for controversy if it was required to decide boundaries for new, single-seat constituencies, it must be doubtful whether there could ever be any generally acceptable answer to this question.

So perhaps other alternatives may merit consideration. Proportional representation is one: indeed it can better ensure "one person, one vote, one value'' than can any other electoral system. It is sometimes said to result in several small parties all being represented in the legislature, and hence in a weak Government. That may be so. But it may be no bad thing. For if in some other countries leaders have been corrupted by power on Independence, and if we want to safeguard against any danger of that happening here, then one useful safeguard may be to ensure that our future Governments do not become over-mighty. Moreover when many parties are represented in a legislature the outcome almost always has to be government by a coalition. That, too, may be no bad thing. For when there are effectively only two parties each has a tendency -- as all of us must know from experience here -- to concentrate on denigrating the other, all too often promoting complaint and dissatisfaction as a result. With a coalition, endless compromises have of necessity to be reached. And in a small island community taking account of the views of others -- and compromising -- may help to promote harmony and unity.

In parenthesis, advocates of Independence claim that it would make Bermudians unite. If it really would, that would be a most powerful argument -- for this community is sadly divided now. But what is the evidence? Prospects hardly seem good so far. For although the leaders of the two main political parties both now favour Independence they are engaged in a bitter argument about how it should be achieved. Not only that. Each party is divided internally too -- with large numbers of UBP supporters upset because the subject has been raised at all at this time, and with some PLP supporters critical of the party's decision to boycott the referendum.

This does all seem rather a pity. And you may in consequence think that the way in which this whole matter was approached has been unfortunate. If so, what approach might have had a better prospect of success? Subjects which must be discussed before Bermuda goes independent I have no simple answer for you. But let me make a general point.

Bermuda's Government and electoral system are patterned on the United Kingdom's. Why? Probably because the United Kingdom, believing theirs to be the best, used theirs as a model for all dependent territories. But theirs has certain disadvantages.

For one thing, the UK's electoral system does not (as we have noted already) provide for "one person, one vote, one value''. And it can result in one party having a huge parliamentary majority despite gaining not very much more than half the total number of votes cast. It could even result in one party having a majority in Parliament despite gaining fewer votes than another party.

Moreover the Westminster model gives the government party almost unlimited power. There are, for instance, far fewer checks and balances in the United Kingdom than in the United States. So the will of a determined and forceful Prime Minister, like the former Mrs. Thatcher, can be imposed far more easily than that of a US President.

Hitherto in Bermuda there has been a limitation which does not exist in the UK. That safeguard, curiously, is the UK's ultimate (and the Governor's immediate) responsibility for the sort of things we were examining earlier -- things which are of fundamental importance in any democracy. It is a limitation which would disappear in the event of Independence.

When considering how best to replace it you may think that we should start by studying whether some form of proportional representation (and there are many forms of this) would suit Bermuda's circumstances better than the "first past the post'' system we now have. It might be worth looking in particular at systems which have proved to work well elsewhere, in order to assess their merits.

Switzerland, for example, despite having such a system, is generally regarded as being one of the most stable countries in the world -- which must suggest that the system has not resulted there in too weak a Government. Moreover its Constitution provides for referenda on a very wide range of issues; and even if referenda have not yet proved universally popular here, there is no doubt that they enable the electorate to play a far fuller part in governing a country.

How best can all these studies -- of entrenchment, of judicial appointments, of electoral systems, and perhaps also of many other issues which I have not had time to mention -- be conducted? The position papers which the Government has promised to produce will presumably be intended to outline its views about many of these matters. But will they be based on the sort of detailed study which I have been advocating? I am doubtful. And there is in my present view no doubt at all but that the Opposition will denounce many of the Government's views as totally unacceptable.

What then? It does now seem most unlikely that the referendum will result in a vote for Independence. But, if it did, then the probable next step would be a conference, attended by representatives of the UBP and of the PLP, under UK chairmanship, to decide on the provisions of an Independence Constitution. And if, as would be likely, those attending that conference followed the example set during other similar conferences, then almost all their time would be spent in argument about the electoral system. Little would be left even to discuss, let alone to study, all the other complex issues we have been considering; and the result would almost certainly be that decisions were taken, in a hurry, to adopt as models the provisions in some other country's constitution. Provisions which, had the position been properly researched, would have been known to have failed to safeguard democratic institutions adequately.

You may think that that would not be at all desirable. In which case it is probably fortunate that the referendum seems doomed. For that will mean there is time to embark on proper studies in an endeavour to explore whether some consensus can be reached about safeguards which should help to assuage the anxieties which many people feel when contemplating the prospect of Independence.

But if there is to be a consensus, the studies cannot be undertaken by either of the two political parties on its own. Nor, you may think, should they be undertaken by politicians alone, even were the two parties to co-operate in such a venture, perhaps forming a joint select committee for the purpose: politicians have too great an interest in power -- their own power -- to be entrusted with the task. The need will be for a much wider group, representing as many different interests as possible. Some members of it might be drawn from international or from local businesses. Others from trade unions. Some might be academics, others lawyers, others again former independent senators or retired senior public officers. The hope would have to be that such a group could produce generally acceptable answers to the difficult questions I have posed.

FORMER DEPUTY -- Mr. Peter Lloyd