evidence of forgery, inspection irregularities, and a failure of the owners to investigate the stability of the ship which cast into doubt the Marques' basic seaworthiness and her captain's competence.

The investigation began on June 5 when Capt. James de Coverly from the UK Department of Transport's head office in London arrived in Bermuda to interview all parties involved. A series of official hearings were held in Devon, England and London which stretched over two years. The official report was finally read in the House of Commons in May 1987.

Forgery In October 1985, the Board of Inquiry learned that the Captain Finlay had forged his licence. Finlay's original captain's license, issued by the US Coast Guard, restricted him to sailing within 100 miles of the US coastline.

The certificate had been altered to allow him to sail the entire Atlantic and was presented to authorities in London as proof of his experience.

Mr. John Reeder of the Department of Transport said: "Captain Finlay had little experience in square riggers.'' Inspection Waived The Board learned of an even more serious breach of the rules. The London Transportation Board had waived its usual procedure in granting a certificate of seaworthiness for the 67 year old barque.

It was also revealed that the famous ship which had been featured in several television series was given an exemption certificate that allowed her to sail without a fresh inspection.

A British Government Junior Minister admitted he had bent the rules for the Marques owner Mark Litchfield. Instead of an official inspection, the Marques was allowed to sail on the assertions of seaworthiness made by the owner's own marine surveyor.

then Transport Undersecretary David Mitchell testified that British MP Andrew Rowe had written to him on behalf of the owner Mark Litchfield that the ship's commercial future would be jeopardised if it had to be hauled out of the water for a fresh inspection. The owner's surveyor gave the Marques a clean bill of health and this assessment was accepted.

The Marques was issued with a Load Line Exemption Certificate which allowed her to sail legally outside of British waters.

When the Board reconvened in April 1986, it was also revealed that the current owner and the former co-owners, Mr Litchfield in partnership with Robert Cecil Wright, had failed to follow strong advice from a Department of Trade inspector in 1977 to investigate the vessel's stability.

Inspectors had recommended stability checks several times in the years leading up to the disaster. This department was responsible for British shipping regulations until 1983, the same year Mr. Litchfield became sole owner, when responsibility passed to the Department of Transport.

Mr. Reeder, in his final submission to the Wreck Commission, said: "Looking at the evidence as a whole, there we have got a stability recommendadtoin which was simple not pursued at any stage.'' Subsequently, measurements/calculations were made by British officials which suggested the Marques was unstable, which opinion was contested and countered by Mr. Litchfield with a set of his own drawings from a Spanish boatyard.

Mr. Wright who had formerly owned the Marques in partnership with Mr.

Litchfield, was Litchfield's most severe critic, arguing that the Marques should never have gone on such an arduous voyage and that she was unseaworthy.

It was also suggested at one point in the long inquiry that the famous ship's frequent changes of rigging style for different television shows may have weakened the ship.

The Report The final 290-page report of the inquiry was tabled in the House of Commons by the UK Secretary of State for Transport in May, 1987, nearly two years after the Marques tragedy, quoted in part below: "The report concludes that the cause of loss of Marques was an unexpected and violent squall which resulted in severe heeling, flooding, and sinking of the ship. The report finds that it is not the fault of any person or persons that the Marques had insufficient stability to resist the squall, but comments if judged by the knowledge and experience now available, the stability would have been judged inadequate and the vessel unseaworthy for operation of a sail training ship in non coastal waters.

"The report finds the Marques was in proper state of repair, and that so far as the structure of the vessel was concerned she was a safe and seaworthy condition. It also finds that that, with certain reservations, she was properly manned and sailed.

"The report's main recommendation is that criteria should be developed for assessing safe standards of stability for sail training vessels.'' The following recommendations were also made to the Department of Transport: 1) All Load Line Exemption Certificates issues should expressly define that the freeing ports are in working order and unobstructed.

2) To publish guidance to their surveyors and those concerned with designing, building, converting or operating sail training ships and specific recommendations regarding hatches and ventilation.

These recommendations were made to sail training organisations: 1) Include in the racing rules, a requirement for at least one English speaking person on board.

2) Include in the communications instructions and at regular Captain's briefings, the need for all masters to report on any situation of potential danger. Included in the Communications Schedule, a requirement that the guard ship or communications vessel make scheduled four hourly broadcasts to all vessels.

3) The requirement that all vessels carry radio equipment allowing them to receive and transmit directly to the guard or communications vessels at all times.

4) Detailed weather forecasts should be broadcast at four hourly intervals to all vessels.

5) A second vessel designated before the race to substitute for the guard vessel if she has to leave the fleet or becomes disabled.

6) No babies or children under the age of 15 or 16 allowed on board in any capacity.

7) Owners and operators be required to verify with the issuing authority the validity of any certificate or license offered by a proposed master of a sail training ship.