BY 1972 the structure of the Black Beret Cadre (BBC) completely collapsed, the group's moderate members abandoning - and, in some instances, publicly denouncing - the organisation, leaving only a handful of dedicated zealots to brood in the ruins of what had been Bermuda's militant vanguard.

The group's demise as a formal organisation was not orchestrated by the authorities, who in fact largely avoided wrecking-ball tactics in the form of police raids or legal prohibitions against the subversive group.

A ban would have created martyrs; allowing the 50-or-so hard-core members to devote the bulk of their energies to fighting among themselves instead of confronting the Establishment would create discord - and disintegration.

In the end the Beret edifice did collapse from within, the weight of its own many internal contradictions bringing the ceiling crashing down: growing dismay about a fanatical leadership's violent methodology among rank-and-file supporters, the mistrust and open hostility of the political parties and trade unions the Berets attempted to court as allies of convenience in an all-out war against the Establishment and, ultimately, crushing public indifference to its aims and objectives. Although the Berets kept paying rent on their Bassett Building headquarters on Court Street and its "Liberation School" activities continued - the indoctrination of children with Black Power and Communist precepts - in the "cultural centre" set up in the basement, there were no regular meetings throughout 1972. Those "councils of war" that did take place were sparsely attended, only a dedicated few trying to keep the torch of Bermudian revolution from sputtering out.

Official "counter-subversion" efforts, co-ordinated by Government House - which at the time actively exercised reserve powers on internal security matters in Bermuda before largely ceding them to the island's Government in the 1980s and '90s - were limited to blitzkrieg public relations efforts.

"If trouble in paradise is to be averted," said an FCO adviser who consulted with then Governor Lord Martonmere in May, 1971 on official moves that could check the spread of Black Beret influence, "it seems to me that the following considerations might help: that the Bermuda Government should come out firmly in favour of multi-racialism and social progress.

"The Black Berets are racialists feeding on latent discontent against an allegedly unprogressive, part-time Government by rich men . . . Bermuda's short-term problem, as I see it, is to frustrate the growth of trouble in paradise by policies and measures which will frustrate the efforts of the main racialist trouble-makers."

Education, housing and employment opportunities in a civil service that was rapidly expanding to fast track black Bermudians who had been excluded from the traditional economic bastions of white wealth and privilege were promoted with increasing vigour by the Government.

United Bermuda Party Parliamentarian Jim Woolridge became among the most vociferous and unrelenting critics of Black Power in the House of Assembly, repeatedly pointing out that while militants had no difficulty identifying problems in Bermuda society they offered no practical solutions - "they have a sterile mentality; they just want to tear everything down. We want to build. Anyone can take down a building, a system or even a society - demolishing something doesn't require any particular skill; however, it takes brains, patience and foresight to construct something of lasting value."

And then UBP patriarch Sir Henry Tucker - "general manager of the Bank of Bermuda and general manager of Bermuda, too" as Sir John Sharpe said of him - stepped down as Government Leader at the end of 1971 and Sir Edward Richards, a former leader of the desegregation movement, replaced him as the island's first Premier.

With Sir Edward's elevation it was difficult to argue that Government's commitment to remaking the island into a bi-racial community, one in which merit would count for far more than pedigree, was not genuine. As Frank Manning noted in his book Bermudian Politics In Transition: "If this was tokenism, it was tokenism on a scale hitherto unknown in Bermuda . . ."

The FCO's decision to encourage an "imaginative and vigorous" counter-subversion campaign against the Berets, one that largely eschewed heavy-handed confrontations in favour of a dialogue-based approach with the broader Bermudian community, had paid rich dividends. By 1972 the BBC was isolated, increasingly marginalised and existed as an organisation in name only.

"Employment opportunities for black Bermudians have improved considerably in the last few years and they are now to be found in banks, insurance offices, etc.," reads a secret 1971 FCO assessment of Bermuda's fits-and-starts transformation from a segregated society ("it was more of a large country club in the 1950s than a small country") to an integrated community.

"These new opportunities need to be broadened and encouraged but multiracialism cannot succeed if the racialist doctrine of Black Power and its derivatives become firmly established in Bermuda. The substantial black middle class are more or less immune and it is among young people that the danger lies . . ."

This FCO report, while noting that a "counter-propaganda campaign" would more likely succeed in diluting Beret influence than any heavy-handed Government crackdowns, did however recommend that immediate steps be taken to control both the contents of locally-produced Black Beret leaflets and the importation of American Black Power literature.

"It is not easy to ban (literature) but having looked at a selection of Black Power publications and similar literature (being distributed in Bermuda by the Berets), it is hard to imagine anything more poisonous to the young mind," reads the report.

"The cold-blooded murder of three (American) sheriffs appears in a Black Panther magazine as "Three Pigs Executed", side by side with articles on how to make a sawn-off shotgun, etc.

"Black Power is not indigenous to Bermuda but is a rub-off from the United States. I doubt if in the affluent conditions of Bermuda it can flourish without sustenance from the outside. It may be necessary to be much tougher with trouble-makers who come on visits, etc."

Visiting trouble-makers, it turned out, were far less of a problem than homegrown radicals who had even then started to compile a hit list of the Bermuda "Pigs" they intended to execute.

DESPITE the many setbacks they had encountered, the Black Beret Cadre's small but rabidly militant leadership was determined to keep both the organisation and its para-military agenda alive - the by-any-means-necessary philosophy which saw them torch Hamilton in their minds' eyes every day, although they only rarely entertained daydreams about what new power structure would emerge Phoenix-like from the ashes.

To this end, throughout 1972 they embarked on a major campaign to amass a secret stockpile of weaponry, an underground arsenal that could be turned on the Establishment and its leading figures when the Berets decided the time was ripe for revolution.

"Beret Yellow (pseudonym) has indicated that he is interested in reviving the Cadre," notes the Government House intelligence committee memorandum covering the period November 8-December 5, 1972.

"He has held informal meetings with a select few of its previously more staunch supporters and has suggested the first task should be to raise funds to send someone abroad for training in guerilla warfare.

"He has met with a good deal of apathy, however.

"Those he has contacted have financial problems of their own and it seems unlikely , at this stage, that he will be able to rekindle any interest in the Cadre."

Earlier in 1972, 24 obsolete Bermuda Regiment drill rifles due to be disarmed at the Bermuda Technical Institute and then discarded had been stolen before they ever reached the school's workshops.

And a Bren gun, part of another consignment of surplus Warwick Camp arms - due to be taken out to sea and dumped 14 miles offshore in deep water - was also stolen, police later discovering the weapon wrapped in sacking and partially hidden in a hedge where it had been due to be collected by a Beret member.

Deputy Governor Ian (Tim) Kinnear, in a memorandum dated November 23, 1972, suggested that other weapons from that second consignment which had "theoretically been counted when they were put in a boat and taken out to sea" by three of the Bermuda Regiment's permanent staff could also have been stolen and passed on to the Black Beret Cadre.

Beret Yellow himself had been arrested in the US earlier in the year on suspicion of breaking into a sporting goods store and stealing a high-powered hunting rifle. He skipped bail and returned to Bermuda before standing trial - an event that apparently caused his father, a prominent public figure, to seek medical treatment in Toronto for nervous strain.

While Government House and the Bermuda Government believed the Beret influence on the local scene was finally waning, the militant organisation self-immolating as a result of its own highly combustible philosophy and increasing friction between extremists and moderates, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office was less convinced.

Alarmed at reports that Warwick Camp weaponry was finding its way into the hands of a diminished but highly militant Beret rump, a FCO official attached to the West Indian desk made the following hand-written comments on Kinnear's November 23 communique: "Although paragraph 12 of the (Bermuda) intelligence committee report blandly states 'nothing of security interest to report', there is still outstanding the case of 24 drill rifles (stolen from the Bermuda Technical Institute) . . .

"We have not yet heard whether the expression of confidence by the police in their prospects of recovering the weapons has been justified.

"There is also the case of further lack of security on the part of the Bermuda Regiment when dispensing with surplus Bren guns. Despite checks and counter-checks when the guns were dumped in the deep sea, one gun was found lying in a hedge wrapped in sacking!

"A board of inquiry has been convened by the Governor. I have reminded Govt. House that we would like to know the outcome of both incidents."

And in December, 1972 recently arrived Governor Sir Richard Sharples alluded to a possible Beret connection to the September 9 murder of Police Commissioner George Duckett - a crime so very unprecedented in the Bermudian experience it was originally thought to have been the handiwork of either a madman or drug dealers.

"Chief Superintendant (Bill) Wright of Scotland Yard has returned to Britain. He has been in charge of the enquiry into the murder of Mr. George Duckett and will be followed shortly by Detective Sargeant (Basil) Haddrell," Sir Richard said in a dispatch to the FCO.

"They will leave further routine investigation to the Bermuda Police for the time being and return to Bermuda in due crisis; but their departure is an indication that no solution to the crime is in sight.

"Mr. Wright is now inclined to discount any connection between the former Commissioner's murder and drug traffic.

"This leaves a grudge against Mr. Duckett personally, or a political assassination as the most likely motives. Obtaining information about the activities of a small hard core of the Black Beret Cadre must remain a priority."

Seemingly this intelligence-gathering directive never became enough of a priority.

Just 12 weeks later Bill Wright and Basil Haddrell returned to the island to head up the murder squad investigating the assassinations of both Sir Richard and his young aide-de-camp, Captain Hugh Sayers.

They were murdered by Beret associate Erskine Durrant (Buck) Burrows and at least two confederates on March 10, 1973 in the grounds of Government House ("I was not alone when I went up to Government House to kill the Governor but I shall never reveal who or how many others were with me," Burrows wrote in his confession).

One of the weapons involved was the same handgun that Burrows had used to kill Commissioner Duckett.

AT the beginning of 1972, tourists trying to bronco bust rented Mobylettes in the middle of Front Street seemed to be the most hazardous aspect of life in Bermuda.

The air was filled with the melodious birdsong of Hubert Smith's Bermuda Is Another World, recorded a year or so earlier. The hotels were filled to capacity.

The strikes and labour unrest that had so violently punctuated 1970 and 1971, exploited by the Berets who had attempted to sow the seeds of Black Power militarism on the picket lines, had been replaced by an atmosphere very close to the postcard image of Bermuda - sun, sand and a sybaritic lifestyle.

It seemed that the south wind - "The Sandman's Wind" that 19th-century Bermudians blamed for the lethargic pace of life in Bermuda - was blowing non-stop across the island.

But it would soon give way to more violent gusts when the Black Berets made their most shocking strikes against the Bermudian Establishment.

Even a General Election in June, 1972 did not lead to a repeat of the politically-motivated violence that had convulsed the island in the run-up to the 1968 poll, the first ever held in Bermuda under the two-party, Westminster-style political system,.

In one of the last regular dispatches he forwarded to the FCO prior to the end of his term, outgoing Governor Lord Martonmere referred to the sea-change in the Bermudian mood as the United Bermuda Party and Progressive Labour Party took to the campaign trail.

"The main interest during the month has been the party preparations for the coming election. It is known that the date of the election is to be June 7. The United Bermuda Party has been holding primaries for the selection of candidates.

"The most significant result was the adoption of a black candidate, Mr. John W. Swan, in Paget East, probably the most conservative of the predominantly white constituencies.

"Although Mr. Swan is a highly respected and wealthy businessman, I doubt that such a result would have been possible at the time of the last election in 1968, and it is an indication of the long way the UBP has moved towards becoming a genuine multi-racial party."

The election - which produced the same 30-10 UBP/PLP split in Parliamentary seats as the 1968 ballot - passed off peacefully and there was a markedly lower voter turn-out, 77 per cent as opposed to the 91 per cent who had participated four years earlier.

"But 1968 was an abnormal year," noted Martonmere in a post-election analysis, "with feelings running high after a period of arson and rioting and, of course, the added interest that the election was the first one in the island's history held on party lines. The lower turn-out this year was probably only a return to a more normal level . . ."

"There is only one comment which I would like to make on the outcome of the election at this stage," said Martonmere. "I think it is generally agreed that a really heavy defeat for the PLP would have been bad for the party and bad for Bermuda. There are those (even in the UBP) who feel that a modest gain in the number of its seats in the House of Assembly would have encouraged the party to be more constructive in its opposition.

"While the party will be disapointed it did not do better, the fact that it did not lose any further seats will, I hope, confirm it in the more responsible and non-racial approach it has adopted in recent months."

The FCO, in a June 14 internal memorandum, was clearly delighted that the election had passed entirely without incident, "held in an atmosphere of calm with the minimum of abuse or political mud-slinging (by either party)."

"Activity of the Black Beret Cadre (throughout the election period) is at a lower level than ever and there are no signs of the organisation being reactivated," the memo optimistically concluded. "The internal security situation is calm and likely to continue so . . ."

The calm proved to be short-lived. Three months later the Police Commissioner was assassinated at his home, the sombrely named Bleak House, in Devonshire.

AT a Government House intelligence committee meeting convened four days before Duckett's murder - and which the Commissioner attended - Acting Governor Tim Kinnear concluded any imminent threat from the Black Beret Cadre had vanished.

"The name 'Black Beret' is hardly ever heard now," Kinnear is reported as saying in the minutes of that September 5 meeting. "The Cadre seems to have folded up in the same way as the (militant) Progressive Labour Party Youth Wing in 1970."

Ten days later Kinnear was attempting to explain the seemingly inexplicable in a long and detailed report on the Duckett killing he dispatched to the FCO.

"The Commissioner of Police and his family were attacked shortly before 9 o'clock on Saturday evening, 9 September, at their home. The Commissioner was shot and killed and his daughter injured. Mrs. Duckett escaped unharmed.

"It would be hard to believe when the intelligence committee met (on September 4) and its made its assessment of 'no obvious signs of trouble ahead' that there was the slightest likelihood that a member of that committee would be brutally murdered a few days later.

"It is over a year since the Black Beret Cadre stopped putting out its publication; it has held no (regular) meetings for almost as long and there has been no evidence recently to suggest that there isany organised body on the island bent on violence, let alone killing . . .

"It would be imprudent, however, to overlook the fact that a number of young men on this island have been indoctrinated in violence over the last three years through the activities of the Black Beret Cadre; it would be stupid to pretend that this will not have rubbed off on some of them.

"While the Cadre has to all intents and purposes ceased to exist, there is always the possibility that a small group of the more militant members have gone underground and that we have been unaware of their activities."

In marked contrast to the plain-sailing-ahead conclusions he had arrived at on September 4, 1972, in this instance Kinnear's information and intuition were both unerringly accurate.