The Auditor General's report on the state of progress - or, more accurately, the lack thereof - at the Berkeley construction site raises a number of serious questions both about Government's ability to award contracts and the contractor's ability to deliver what it promised.

Already there have been efforts to throw smoke over the very legitimate concerns raised by the Auditor and who is responsible for the timely and efficient completion of this project.

These efforts seem to be aimed at creating doubt about the motivation of the Auditor, and putting distance between the Government and the contractor, Pro-Active Management Systems Ltd., so that the facts themselves will be forgotten or ignored.

These are the facts: When the Berkeley project was being tendered, the technical officers in the Ministry of Works and Engineering felt Pro-Active was too high risk to make the shortlist for a project of that scale, let alone to be granted the contract.

Eventually, the technical officers recommended that BermudaTech Construction, the low bidder, should get the contract. This was rejected by the Cabinet which instead chose Pro-Active, in spite of the fact that it had not secured a performance bond at that time.

It is a fact that BermudaTech later defaulted on its construction work at Spice Valley Middle School and later went out of business, and in hindsight this suggests that Government may well have put the Berkeley project at risk had it chosen BermudaTech. Certainly, the idea that BermudaTech was depending on the Berkeley project for its survival is not a rationale for giving it the contract; Government is not and should never be in the corporate welfare business. Having said that, it is not known what ultimately caused BermudaTech's demise, and it cannot be said with absolute certainty what difference the Berkeley project would have made.

Nor does it mean that Pro-Active was the right choice. The technical officers in Works certainly did not think so and the most compelling reason they could provide for Pro-Active getting the contract was that it would be politically desirable, hardly a judgment that technical officers should have been making in the first place. Nor is it a good reason for a Cabinet selection. There's a thin line between "politically desirable" and "cronyism" and it is hard to believe that Bermuda's voters changed governments to simply to change one form of alleged cronyism for another.

What is a fact is that the technical officers' worst fears about Pro-Active seem to have been realised. The company has experienced cash flow difficulties in the project and has already requested and received loans and advances from the Government, apparently in excess of the work done, confirming the technical officers' concerns about the financial stability of the company.

In spite of the now numerous completion dates and promises that Works Minister Alex Scott has made about the project, the Auditor's Report shows that by the contractor's own estimates it is hopelessly delayed and that it is unlikely that it will be finished by January, 2004 (five months behind schedule) or even March, 2004 (seven months behind) unless the current rate of work is increased.

What the Auditor was unable to determine was whether the project was on budget. But his report does contain a hint. Pro-Active has not been prepared to have its staff work overtime in spite of the delays in the project. Is it possible that Pro-Active's unwillingness is due to the fact that paying its workers double time or more would send its costs through the roof?

Anyone who been involved in any kind of construction in Bermuda knows that cost increases and delays can occur, sometimes with dizzying speed, and that finding a contractor who can complete a job on time and on or under budget is akin to finding the proverbial needle in a haystack.

But due diligence and care in selection of a contractor and rigorous and constant oversight of the project can eliminate much of the risk. It would appear that the technical officers in Works tried to do this, only to be overruled by the Cabinet.

Now, in spite of the best efforts of the technical officers involved in the supervision of this project, the Government has failed to exert the necessary pressure to get this project back on track even though it has been clear for months that it is in trouble.

The Auditor General's report only confirms these fears and he deserves credit, not castigation, for bringing these problems to light.

It is not too late for the Government to at the very least stop the project from becoming any further delayed. And in the meantime, it would do well to follow the Auditor's advice and to advise the Education Ministry that the school will not be finished in September, 2003 and that alternative arrangements will have to be made. There, at least, the Government has a fallback position; the existing Berkeley Institute can give another year's service.

Then again, that may have been the plan all along.