If one is to take the United States administration at its word on Iraq, then it seems to be going about the whole business of starting a war in a pretty bumbling fashion. Saddam Hussein is certainly a villain, and seems neither to regret his crimes, nor to want to mend his ways. There is evidence that he is continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction. There is evidence that he still sees himself as a Messianic figure in the Middle East.

But… there is no evidence that he has done anything grand-scale nasty since the Gulf War. Outside the United States, in the court of public opinion, it's a simple call. He was punished for his crimes and hasn't committed any more. The US, therefore, has no moral right to try to punish him again. Even inside the United States, where public opinion against figures like Mr. Hussein is very strong, doubts about the wisdom of President Bush's often-repeated promise to prosecute another war are being expressed by some fairly senior figures.

One can understand a certain amount of sabre rattling. Bush the Elder made a major, expensive mistake by failing to get Saddam Hussein off the throne before he called a halt to Desert Storm, and it is perfectly understandable that Bush the Younger should want to strike a particular pose over that. But that is a long way from justifying the never-ending US administration talk about war. Every time President Bush rattles his sabre, he loses more friends and squanders more American influence and support. It might be a slow process, but it is obviously under way, and at an accelerating pace. He has already put his staunchest ally, Tony Blair, in a very unpleasant political dilemma in the UK.

A US war against Iraq in the present circumstances is a most distinctly unpopular concept in Britain, and it is a concept with which Mr. Blair has become publicly identified, to his political detriment. Yet Britain's diplomatic and military support would be crucial in the prosecution of a war. US attempts to persuade public opinion to take its side have been ineffective outside the United States. So why on earth does the US administration keep at it?

The short answer is that the US administration should not be taken at its word on Iraq. There is rather less (perhaps more, depending on your viewpoint) to it than they would like you to think there is. It is a mistake to consider any country in the Middle East in isolation from the others, just as it is a mistake to see the attack on the World Trade Center as a random, pointless event. Osama bin Laden's aim was not to strike at the United States as much as it was to further the cause of Islamic revolution within the Muslim world. To do that, he produced a piece of political theatre he hoped would reach the audience that concerned him the most - the umma, or universal Islamic community.

The script seemed obvious: America, the villain, would react in concert with its Middle Eastern allies by killing heroic Muslims like flies. The ensuing outrage would open a gulf between state and society in the Middle East, and the governments allied with the West many of which are repressive, corrupt, and illegitimate would find themselves adrift from the populations that support them. So in the post-September 11 world, the enemies of the United States are not nations, but radicalised Muslims.

Middle Eastern nations, in this struggle, are important, complex factors to be taken into account, but they are not the enemy. In order to defeat radical Muslims, the US must ensure the process of radicalisation is slowed and, eventually, reversed, all the while ensuring that already-radical Muslims are at least contained. This is a very complex goal. Almost every US step taken against Mr. bin Laden and his people is capable of being seen as a step against Islam. Every step US allies in the Middle East take against terrorism is capable of being seen as a step against Islam.

And there is certainly no shortage of people who have an interest in trying to make sure the actions of the US and its allies are seen in that way. There are potential flashpoints all over the world - the struggle between Israel and the Palestinians is the most dangerous, but there are others. The India/Pakistan dispute over Kashmir is one, another is the domestic situation in Pakistan. There is a constant danger that al Qaeda will become stronger by allying itself with other radical groups - there were reports just a few weeks ago that they were in talks with Hezbollah, the Lebanese terrorist organisation, with a view to coordinating strategy against the US.

It may be that the only reason Mr. bin Laden and Mr. Hussein haven't already arranged a marriage is the unanswered question of which one of them would wear the pants in the relationship. More than one Middle Eastern country has reacted to the War on Terrorism by playing a double game - professing support for the US overtly, while covertly supporting radical Muslims. Saudi Arabia may be a good example. There are also countries that overtly support radical Muslims, whilst covertly supporting the US. Holding Middle Eastern power in balance is an extremely delicate business at the moment.

Iraq has the potential to be a key factor in this struggle. Even assuming the loss of 40 percent of its army and air force order of battle in the Gulf War, Iraq is still the strongest and most effective military power in the Gulf. Iraqis may not be the finest fighters in the world, but Mr. Hussein is no fool - he will have learned many lessons from the Gulf War. He has learned so much about land-based air defence operations as a result of operating against US and British aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones that he was able to provide significant aid to Serbia during the fighting in Kosovo, passing on a number of successful air defence tactics.

Iraq is known to have a significant chemical and biological capability, perhaps including infectious agents like smallpox and plague. The Iraqis are known to have had some difficulty with delivering these weapons via missile and artillery - but may well have been experimenting with drones and other pilotless aircraft. They may also have considered piloted suicide missions.

Iraq cannot hope to win a conventional war against the United States, but its potential for making mischief is enormous. Former US National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, for example, worried aloud a few days ago, when he expressed his misgivings about the American plan to invade Iraq, that Iraq might arm terrorists with weapons of mass destruction. But Mr. Hussein's best chance for successful offensive action against the West these days seems to be political, not military.

What, for example, might be the effect if he managed to forge some kind of treaty with other Islamic countries in the Middle East? What if he made common cause with Saudi Arabia, for example? What if he suddenly got religion and managed to galvanise Turkey's Muslim population into supporting him? So all the sabre-rattling, I think, is aimed at keeping that delicate Middle East region in balance. The US administration is trying to make Saddam Hussein keep his head down, trying to worry his population, especially his government and his armed forces, and trying to make other countries in the area believe that joining forces with Iraq would not be a good idea at the present time, certainly not while Iraq is under threat of imminent US invasion.

During the years since the Gulf War, the intelligence community is not likely to have been idle, either. One must assume their presence in Iraq, and in other countries in the Middle East, has increased and been made more effective than it was before Operation Desert Storm. We can expect to see some odd things happening. Perhaps the death of Fatah founder-become-terrorist-odd-job-man Abu Nidal in Baghdad last week was one of them. A suicide with several gunshot wounds? Makes you wish you had a beard to stroke, doesn't it? So what is the US really doing over there?

Read George Bush's statement on the Middle East of June 24 carefully. It deserves more attention than it has been given. It seems to me to demonstrate that, wonder of wonders, the US has discovered subtlety somewhere deep within itself, and intends to adopt a policy that employs this new phenomenon. The best friend radical Muslims ever had was tyranny, of which there is plenty in the Middle East. The feeling of powerlessness it creates in people has been an extraordinary recruiting agent.

What the new recruits fail to realise until too late is that they are simply being asked to exchange one form of tyranny for another. The US answer to radical Muslims is to export democracy to the Middle East, in much the same way that Fidel Castro once tried to export revolution to South America. The US administration intends to start where it has its best chance for success - with a democratic Palestinian state. “If Palestinians embrace democracy, confront corruption and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a provisional state of Palestine,” said President Bush. “With a dedicated effort, this state could rise rapidly, as it comes to terms with Israel, Egypt and Jordan on practical issues such as security.”

And so, of course, might other such states. In his speech, President Bush talked about Palestine specifically, but no one who reads it carefully will be left in much doubt that he was thinking of the Middle East as a whole. If he manages to pull it off, democracy will be a more potent alternative for the hopeless, helpless people of the region than radical Islam ever dreamed of being, and the younger Bush will have struck a more powerful blow against the Saddam Husseins of the Middle East than his father ever dreamed of landing.

gshorto@ibl.bm