THE United Bermuda Party briefly considered making Independence the central plank in its 1972 re-election platform because of Britain's decision to join the European Economic Community - until the island's summary ejection from the sterling currency area made any local financial or regulatory implications of British EEC membership moot.

In 1971, following a "yes" vote in a UK referendum on EEC membership, Bermuda's Government Leader Sir Henry Tucker, his deputy Sir Edward Richards and other members of the UBP inner-circle began to weigh the possibility of "major constitutional change" for the island.

Independence was viewed by the UBP leadership as a possible "necessary evil" to protect Bermuda's economy and nascent off-shore business sector from EEC regulations that could have applied here because the island still felll under the British sterling umbrella.

"There is a feeling in some quarters (of Bermuda's Government) that a Britain in Europe will cease to have any interest in its remaining small dependencies and that Bermuda may have to look around for another 'big brother' to lean on," said Governor Lord Martonmere in one of his regular dispatches to London in August, 1971 - providing the first suggestion that Bermudian Independence might be a near-term possibility.

Along with his own report, Martonmere forwarded an extract from the minutes of a Bermuda Executive Council (now Cabinet) meeting held in August when Sir Henry Tucker broached the possibility of dissolving Bermuda's constitutional ties with the United Kingdom: "In discussion, it was said that Her Majesty's Government would be ready to grant Independence to Bermuda if asked to do so: equally, however, HMG was ready to continue the present constitutional arrangements if this is what Bermuda wanted.

"Concern was expressed, however, about the future if HMG were to get more and more involved in Europe and, as a consequence, begin to lose interest in other areas. On such an event it would be essential for Bermuda to seek alternative links, e.g. with Canada or the USA; to have plenty of notice of the need to forge new links; and to do so with Britain's concurrence."

In a hand-written notation on the Martonmere report, a Foreign & Commonwealth Office official said the views being expressed in Bermuda were a natural consequence of London's shifting international priorities - and not an entirely unwelcome development from the British point of view.

"I think this kind of impression would follow naturally from the UK's known desire generally to reduce its 'colonial' commitments, apart from any European plans. It would certainly fit the outlook of present British Ministers," reads the annotation.

"But briefs on Bermuda's future provided to our Ministers should be designed to provide suitable reassurances (on both the EEC and Britain's commitment to its remaining territories) to visitors from Bermuda."

And there were a flurry of visits to Whitehall by Bermuda Cabinet Ministers in the fall and winter of 1971 to assess the impact of British EEC membership on Bermuda, talks where the possibility of Independence were floated "in very general terms".

"The visits have made it clear that Bermuda Ministers are worried about the effects of Britain's entry into the EEC both on Bermuda's economic position and the future of Bermuda as a dependency," said an internal Foreign & Commonwealth memorandum dated September 16, 1971.

"Any briefings for future visits to London by Bermuda Ministers should, of course, include some reassurances about the effect of Britain's entry to the Common Market on the lines of those which have been given repeatedly . . .

"Mr. Sharpe (later Sir John Sharpe, then the island's Finance Minister) suggested during his last visit that Bermuda might have to look around for another 'protector'; he seemed to have Canada in mind as a possibility."

Sir John and other members of the UBP indeed floated a trial balloon in 1971 for a form of associated statehood between an Independent Bermuda and Canada, although only the broadest contours of the proposal were ever sketched out publicly and no fine diplomatic detail ever added.

The idea was greeted lukewarmly by both pro- and anti-Independence factions who were never clear on what concessions Bermuda would have to grant Ottawa in return for the island falling under its economic, educational and internal security umbrella.

The concept of Bermuda becoming "Canada's Puerto Rico" - a self-governing commonwealth loosely associated with the Canadian federation - was floated again during the 1995 Independence debate, when it was touted as an alternative to full sovereignty and described as a form of "interdependence". Again the concept failed to attract much interest from Bermudians.

As early as 1971 the Foreign & Commonwealth Office viewed the idea of an "association" between an Independent Bermuda and Canada as both unrealistic and unlikely.

"As to the constitutional future of Bermuda, it would seem a mistake to give any reassurances which might seem to contradict previous statements that we are willing to grant Bermuda her Independence when she feels ready for it," says an internal FCO memorandum on Bermudian Independence.

"The idea of finding another 'big brother', however, does not seem to me very realistic and we should be wary of encouraging it."

In 1972 Britain abruptly floated its sterling currency - which had been fixed at an exchange rate of $2.40 to the pound - and formally abolished the sterling area that still existed in British colonies and some Commonwealth nations.

THE decision allowed Bermuda to peg the island's dollar, introduced in 1970, to the US dollar rather than the pound sterling and obviated some of the EEC regulations that might otherwise have applied to the island as a result of British membership in the trade bloc.

But the British considered the prospect of imminent Bermudian Independence a serious likelihood when Government Leader Sir Henry Tucker visited London in November, 1971.

Before the Bermudian leader arrived, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office requested that Britain's Defence Department draw up a discussion paper on post-Independence defence arrangements between Bermuda and the UK that could be presented to Sir Henry at the London talks.

"While there seems to me no possibility of making conclusions before Sir Henry Tucker's visit on the kind of 'Defence Treaty package' we would be prepared to negotiate, there would be obvious advantage in trying to establish early what importance (we) attach in terms of British and American interest in the continued use of Bermuda (after Independence) . . .

"Among the subjects which will be discussed (between the FCO and Sir Henry) is constitutional advance and this could include some consideration of the possibility of the territory moving to Independence at some future date.

"It is very likely that in any discussion of possible Independence, the Bermudan (sic) leaders will wish to raise the question of what sort of defence arrangements, if any, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider for Bermuda post-Independence.

"In view of the possibility of this matter being raised soon, the Ministry of Defence may wish to give some consideration now to the question of defence arrangements for Bermuda after Independence.

"We appreciate that the general policy on such questions in relation to emerging nations is quite clear, but special factors (strategic location, population demographics, extent - if any - of Soviet penetration, etc.) have altered the policy as for example in the case of Mauritius. You may wish to consider to what extent the current and future value to us in strategic terms of our Naval base in Bermuda (HMS Malabar) and of the US bases constitutes a special factor which should influence HMG to deviate from the general line of policy for Independent Commonwealth States."

In a confidential memorandum prepared by the Defence Department for the London talks, Britain's military mandarins argued that the role of the island in both regional and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation strategic planning could not be underestimated.

"So long as British defence responsibilities in the Caribbean remain - and it is not at present easy to see early prospects of losing them (given the number of British colonies) - they entail the use of Bermuda in the following ways:

"Senior Naval Officer West Indies' Headquarters: SNOWI exercises operational control over his two frigates in the Caribbean from his headquarters in Bermuda (HMS Malabar). Administrative facilities with the normal logistic backing and secretarial functions, stores and transport and a small intelligence staff are maintained there to support him.

"Naval Maintenance and Fuel Facilities: The Royal Navy has very limited facilities in the large Dockyard but if the use of Chaguaramas, Trinidad were denied to us for this purpose Bermuda would be a welcome alternative. Shell provides fuelling facilities for the Royal Navy in Bermuda. If these were no longer available to us, we should have to rely on the use of tankers - hardly satisfactory.

"Air Staging Facilities: Bermuda is a focal point for mounting Caribbean contingency plans. It can be reached in one stage by VC10, Britannia, Hercules and Belfast (military) aircraft. Of these, only the VC10 can overfly Bermuda to Nassau, and then only with a reduced payload. If Bermuda were not available then either Gander (Newfoundland) or Lajos (Azores) would have to be used by aircraft other than the VC10: both those airfields could have political restraints imposed (by the Canadians and Portuguese governments) which might preclude their use in an intervention situation (by UK troops).

"In the event of the loss of the air staging facilities in Bermuda our options would be greatly reduced, although VC10s and Hercules could use airfields on the East Coast of the United States. We would therefore wish to retain air staging facilities in Bermuda for so long as we retained significant defence responsibilities in the Caribbean."

THE Defence Department considered the American bases in Bermuda - the US Naval Air Station at the East End was geared towards anti-submarine warfare against Soviet ballistic missile submarines operating in the Atlantic - an indispensible asset in Western defence planning.

"Additionally, Bermuda would always be important to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in periods of tension or war in relation to: a). Reinforcement of Europe from the USA by sea. b).Shipping routes for Caribbean oil sources (which would become particularly important if supplies from other world sources were interrupted). c) Operation and support of maritime aircraft."

The classified Defence Ministry summary concludes by saying it was vital the US and UK check any Soviet military ambitions for an outpost in an Independent Bermuda.

"It is, of course, of especial importance to continue to deny Bermuda's strategic value and its maritime and air facilities to the Soviet Union.

"It is clear, therefore, that Britain and the United States would wish to retain defence interests of some consequence in an Independent Bermuda and would attach great importance to the continued denial of Bermuda to the USSR."

Nevertheless, despite the island's strategic importance the UK Defence Ministry - strapped of cash, men and materiel in 1971 - was not inclined to offer an Independent Bermuda a formal defence treaty.

"It is difficult to express a view on whether these considerations would merit giving some kind of defence commitment to an Independent Bermuda," reads the Defence Department memo.

"We would hope to avoid such a commitment, just as we would hope to avoid it in an Independent Bahamas where we also wish to retain significant defence facilities (the Bahamas became Independent in 1973).

"In general, HMG gives defence commitments (to former colonies) not as a quid pro quo for maintaining defence facilities but because it is considered that the commitments themselves advance British interests."

The Defence Ministry said Britain should under no circumstances agree to assist a sovereign Bermuda in dealing with internal security crises - as it had when troops were flown to the island during the 1968 riots and Royal Navy frigates diverted to the island to provide a show of force along Front Street during 1969 disturbances.

While Britain had agreed to assist local authorities in co-ordinating internal security matters in post-Independence Mauritius, a sometimes fractitious multi-ethnic island off the coast of Africa that hosted a British military presence, it was reluctant to offer Bermuda a similar arrangement because it would set an unhappy precedent in the Caribbean.

"There is a considerable risk that (to do so) might lead to its extension to a number of other Caribbean states approaching Independence - e.g. the Bahamas and British Honduras (now Belize)."

FOLLOWING Sir Henry's November, 1971 meeting with the West Indian Department of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, a follow-up report makes clear that any UBP moves to Bermudian Independence would, in fact, be provisional on British internal security guarantees - which were still not forthcoming.

"From my discussions, I am fairly sure that the Bermuda Government are worried about external defence (commitments) following Independence; they are well aware of the strategic value of their island and will rely on the US, as in fact they do now, for defence against any external aggressor.

"They are much more concerned about internal security: not only do they value the possibility of UK forces being made available in an IS situation, as in 1968 and 1969, but they regard the presence of British naval forces as a stabilising factor.

"The IS aspect is in fact the strongest element in Bermuda's desire not to seek Independence (without British guarantees of assistance in event of future riots).

"If we are ever to be rid of our responsibility for the island, we must seek a solution to the IS problem. I gathered from talks with the US Consul General in Bermuda that the US would be very unwilling to be involved in IS matters (in an Independent Bermuda)."

By the beginning of 1972 talks between Bermuda and Britain on post-Independence security arrangements were superseded by London's abolition of the sterling area - which instantly rendered the UBP's short-lived sovereignty initiative redundant.

Independence was to remain conspicuous by its absence from UBP manifestos and position papers until Sir John Swan's failed 1995 sovereignty initiative.