Juvenile Court Magistrate Carlisle Greaves when he sentenced three schoolboys to two years in an approved society for setting fire to Harrington Sound Primary School in February, 1999.

*** The three accused have each pleaded guilty to the offence charged under Section 426 (1) of the Criminal Code.

It is a serious offence.

By their plea they have each accepted the facts as presented by the prosecution. There has been no objection or issue raised thereto by their counsel or in any of the accused's evidence in mitigation. The plea is unequivocal. The facts are accepted.

A social inquiry report in respect of each offender has been submitted as requested by counsel.

Each offender and counsel has had a copy, and each probation officer has been subject to lengthy examination by each counsel on those matters of concern to the defence.

We have heard testimony by two of the accused, by witnesses to their character, as well as by professionals.

We have heard mitigation addresses by each counsel.

We are at the most difficult point of every trial -- the sentencing.

Had the offenders been adults the penalty could have been on indictment. Seven years or on summary conviction 12 months imprisonment.

At this juvenile level the young offenders Act provides for penalties of absolute discharge, conditional discharge, fines of $168.00, compensation of $240.00 and at the time of the commission of this offence a whipping.

It is accepted by all that all the above penalties are inappropriate in this case. The other penalties provided are probation and committal to an approved society. The probation officers have each recommended committal to an approved society for each offender.

Each counsel has strongly opposed such sentence, they have called professional testimony against its appropriateness.

Each counsel is of the view that probation is the appropriate order. Although each case must be treated separate and distinct on its own particular merits, this court recognises a number of common characteristics, which it must weigh in its determination of sentence.

It is accepted that except for the commission of this offence, each of these offenders has been citizens of good character.

They are the recipients of good upbringing, in good homes, school, and peerage.

They are bright boys performing in the top ten of their classes.

They are good community servers, performing in music, sports and other areas of the community.

They are the recipients of good old Boy Scout training.

Their parents have made positive efforts to attain professional help for them after the incident.

There have been no reports of subsequent offences or delinquence by them since the commission of this offence.

On the other hand, each of these offenders possessed every one of the above characteristics before and at the time of the commission of the offence. Yet they committed the offence anyhow.

It must be accepted that children of that calibre must have known and did in fact know that their acts were wrong, unlawful, dangerous and subject to serious consequences.

The pattern of their conduct is of grave concern.

The facts show that there were several seats of fire, at different parts of the building, propellants were applied, the entire activity must have taken some time and it is revealed that there had been prior similar activity weeks before.

The question is left in one's mind as to how long would this kind of activity have continued, when next, and what next if the activity had not climaxed on the date in question.

In determining the sentence to be applied it is said that every tribunal ought to consider four basic principals of sentencing.

They are restitution, rehabilitation, retribution and deterrence.

In this case the cost has been substantial, $1.3 million, the displacement also substantial. There is no authority to order compensation or fines beyond $240.00.

Thus the principle of restitution is inapplicable.

There has been some attempt at rehabilitation, there has been psychological examination and some counselling, there has been some parental grounding and community service but in the opinion of this court that process is not yet complete.

In every case a court must balance the needs, rights and duty of each offender with the needs, rights and duty of the community against which the offence has been committed.

We have been urged from the defence side that these offenders have already been remedied, that their needs have been met, that there is no further benefit to them or to the society they offended, if they are committed to an approved society.

That to commit them would result in a reversal in their achievements so far.

That they need no further protection from themselves.

We hold the view that there must be a component of retribution, rehabilitation and deterrence in our sentencing.

We ask the question, what message of deterrence we are sending to society if we were to not visit each of these young offenders with a penalty more severe than probation? To every 14- or 15-year-old, to every Juvenile, to every school boy, to every Boy Scout, to every boy who comes from a good home, a good family, a good school, who is bright, learns well, does his homework, plays sports and music, helps in the home, does community service at local organisations, belongs to good organisations, has good peerage, would we be sending him the message that he can set fire in public buildings, in schools, resulting in their destruction, causing million dollar damage, dislocation to users, and walk away with mere probation if he has all of the above qualifications and is able to call evidence of favourable character witnesses and psychologists to say it will not assist him if he is sent to an approved society? And what message would this court be sending to persons of lesser character, ability and understanding if they were to commit the same act or lesser acts? And what message will we send to the offended community who must wonder that if public buildings can be fired with virtual impunity what protection or remedy would they have when their private homes and buildings are fired by Juveniles? We think that in the circumstances society is entitled to demand a sentence that tells other members of society that regardless of their status or character they cannot intentionally, recklessly or by gross neglect burn down their public (or private) buildings without most serious penalty even if they are virtual Sunday school boys.

Society must feel safe that their laws are equally and strongly applied to both Peter and Paul, goose and gander. To escape the consequences of one's act, it cannot be sufficient to state that the offenders needs have been met.

Not even when that offender is a Juvenile.

To do so may result in the spoilage of our youth and the hostaging of our community.

In all the circumstances, and having regard to the limitation in sentencing options, we are satisfied that the question ought not to be whether these offenders should be committed to an approved society, but for how long.

We are satisfied the committal should to some extent, serve the needs of the community by acting as some deterrent to the accuseds and would-be followers as well as serve the needs of the offenders.

Now in further determining the question of committal we have directed ourselves to Section 16 (f) of the Young Offenders Act, which provides the following.

"If the offence is punishable with imprisonment the court may by order commit the child to the care of an approved society (within the meaning of the Protection of Children Act 1943), or to the care of a fit person (whether a relative of the child or not) who is willing to undertake the care of the child.'' In our opinion the reference to an approved society within the meaning of the Protection of Children Act merely refers to that definition set out at 1 of that act which states in essence that an approved society is one approved by the Minister.

The committal itself is not about whether a child is in need of care and control or has been neglected etc. by his parents, but it is about whether he has committed a criminal offence subject to imprisonment. That's the meaning and interpretation of Section 16 (f) of the Young Offenders Act.

We also directed ourselves to Section 11 (2) of the Protection of Children Act 1943, which states: "An approved society may lodge children committed to their care under this Act with suitable persons for such periods and upon such terms as the society thinks fit.'' We have also directed ourselves to Section 12 of the Protection of Children Act 1943 -- which empowers the Minister to: (b) Discharge any child from the care of the society or person to whose care he has been committed...absolutely or subject to conditions.'' We have also directed ourselves to Section 6 of the Young Offenders Act 1950 -- which states: (1) No court shall impose imprisonment on a child.

In all the circumstances we are satisfied after consideration of these provisions that committal to the approved society is not imprisonment. We are satisfied that indeed both the society and the Minister have greater powers than the court itself and can on this very day, even if we set a specific time sentence under Section 8 (2) of the Protection of Children Act 1943, release the children to their parents, psychologist or any person they consider fit.

Notwithstanding all that this court must do its duty and let those others do their duty as they all see fit.

We are impressed by the recommendations suggested by Counsel but we are satisfied that those same conditions can on construction of the referred-to provisions, be carried out by the approved society.

In all the circumstances, we are satisfied that only the egos of those offenders are likely to be affected by committal. Their very admission through their counsel that they have not been ostracised by their community, by their school and peers is evidence of non-detriment.

Given their alleged clean records, and good behavioural patterns we are satisfied that they shall benefit under the Sections 11 (2) and 12 of the Protection of Children Act 1943. i.e. they may achieve early release. We have given credit to the offenders for their guilty pleas, their efforts at rehabilitation so far, the other characteristics and achievements referred to, their ages, their first offence, and their future and we have chosen not to impose the full sentence of committal up to age 18. Had they been adults tried summarily, the sentence could have been 12 months or on indictment seven years.

We think in the circumstances they would have been referred to a higher court for sentencing beyond 12 months.

In the circumstances we think a committal of two years is not unreasonable.

ORDER Each offender is committed to an approved society for two years.

DATED: FEBRUARY 2, 2000 CARLISLE GREAVES, MAGISTRATE JOAN BURGESS, PANEL ALFRED AUGUSTUS, PANEL