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`Directors followed best course of action'

BF&M chief executive officer Glenn Titterton yesterday denied that the choice of the directors to split Bermuda Fire's business was motivated by a desire to "protect'' one side of the business from the other.

The directors followed the best course of action and the professional advice received from the company's accountants and lawyers in the best interests of both sides of the business, Mr. Titterton claimed.

Following a two week break, the Bermuda Fire Insurance litigation resumed last week in the Supreme Court with the cross-examination of Mr. Titterton. The case is being heard by Puisne Judge Vincent Meerabux.

On Monday, Mr. Titterton disputed suggestions by Ian Croxford QC, appearing on behalf of Cooper & Lines, that in 1991 Mr. Titterton had convened a working group on Bermuda Fire's reorganisation as a result of the failure of JP Morgan's review of the company.

JP Morgan had been charged with finding an effective strategy for Bermuda Fire's losses from its account with underwriters H S Weavers of London.

"It didn't seem to me that the JP Morgan project had much to do with the reorganisation project,'' Mr. Titterton said.

When Mr. Croxford said: "You had expected that they would provide a solution for the Weavers problem'', Mr. Titterton qualified: "I believe that's what the financial committee expected, yes.'' However, when Mr. Croxford tried to establish a connection between the Morgan report and the convening of the 1991 working group on reorganisation, Mr.

Titterton said he did not believe that "the one was necessarily dependent on the other''.

Mr. Croxford then inquired into Mr. Titterton's role in accountant Irmgard Viera's search for excess loss coverage of $50 million.

Mr. Croxford said: "You would only have wanted to buy excess of loss coverage for an excess of $50 million if you had suspected there was at least a risk of deterioration.'' Mr. Titterton replied: "I think if I had suspected that, I would have had to report to the finance committee and recommend we take some action like this ... I did not have that feeling ... to the best of my knowledge, Mrs.

Viera was doing this purely as a feasibility study.'' Mr. Titterton also denied Mr. Croxford's suggestions that after taking over as CEO in 1991, his primary objective was to direct the working party reorganisation plan. When Mr. Croxford said that his role was that "of the man who was steering the work of the working group (on the reorganisation)'' Mr. Titterton said this was "so far from the truth of the situation as it existed in 1991, it makes no sense at all.'' When Mr. Croxford suggested that Mr. Titterton had put the reorganisation issue on the "front burner'' by calling a meeting on the subject on February 28, 1991, Mr. Titterton said: "I can't agree with that for the simple reason that I was not an advocate of reorganisation as such.'' When Mr. Croxford then referred to a 1992 memo in which he alleged Mr.

Titterton had written that his primary objective of 1991 had been to implement the directors' reorganisation plan, Mr. Titterton conceded that "clearly it had ranked up there'' but insisted that it was one among many issues.

In examining some documents sent by Mr. Titterton to CD&P lawyer John Collis on February 26, produced in the CD&P discovery phase, Mr. Croxford said the bundle had included "the Miller memorandum'', a memo by Thomas Miller of Coopers & Lines on Bermuda Fire's reorganisation, which Mr. Titterton would have seen by then.

Referring to a note by Mr. Titterton to Mr. Collis, which was included with the documents, Mr. Croxford said: "When you said `You may have some of this already', you can't have been referring to the JP Morgan report.'' The material in question, he suggested, was the Miller memorandum, which he then told Mr. Titterton that "by no later than the 26th of February, you must have seen.'' Mr. Titterton answered: "If everything you have said is correct then that could be correct. I have no recollection of this at all.'' Much of yesterday's sessions pertained to the minutiae of various proforma documents, in particular those relating to reorganisation, and Mr. Titterton's understanding of them at the time of board meetings on July 9 and September 6.

The examination finished with Mr. Croxford's questioning of Mr. Titterton regarding former Bermuda Fire director Donald Lines.

Mr. Croxford: "Mr. Donald Lines seemed to hold some very clear, very emphatic views about the wisdom of getting embroiled in international business and what should be done to get out of it. No doubt Donald Lines' views that you heard were that it was necessary to get out of international business.'' Mr. Titterton answered: "Yes.'' Mr. Croxford then suggested that such a divestment would have to have been made in such a manner as to protect the company's domestic business from international business, to which Mr. Titterton replied: "I never heard him put it in quite those terms ... he was very emphatic about separating them, but I never heard of protecting one from the other.'' Bermuda Fire proceeded with its split in September 1991, and in 1993 went into liquidation, ultimately owing its creditors $450 million.

Glenn Titterton BUSINESS BUC