An ongoing legal battle over allegations of institutional racism returned to the Supreme Court with claims that civil servants improperly advised the Human Rights Board.

Bermudian businessman Harold Darrell has alleged that staff at the Bank of Bermuda leaked confidential information to a third party in 1996, costing him a $3.2 million business deal.

He subsequently said his complaints to the bank were not properly dealt with due to institutional racism, leading him to lodge a complaint with the Human Rights Commission against the bank’s CEO and board of directors.

The Human Rights Board was convened in 2005, but they dismissed the complaint in 2006. A written decision released the following year stated that while the preponderance of submissions related to institutional racism at the bank, the bank itself was not a party to proceedings.

The board found they did not have the power to add the bank as a party under the Human Rights Act 1981, and therefore could not make a ruling against them.

In another action launched earlier this year, Mr Darrell sought damages for “the tort of misfeasance in public office”, arguing that Brenda Dale or Myra Virgil — as Director or Acting Director of the Department of Human Affairs — had maliciously influenced and/or improperly advised the board.

The Department of Cultural Affairs and the Minister of Culture and Social Rehabilitation were also listed as defendants, but the Department cannot be sued as it is not a legal person and there was no cause of action listed against the Minister.

All four defendants applied for the claims to be struck out, arguing among other points that the six-year period of limitation had long since expired.

During a hearing on the strike out applications, Puisne Judge Stephen Hellman struck out the claims of maliciously influencing the board, finding the claims were outside of the period of limitation.

However he was unable to determine if the claim of improperly advising the board during a meeting was similarly time-barred as Mr Darrell stated he only became aware of the meeting through a 2011 letter from the Ombudsman.

Mr Darrell alleged that the meeting between the department and the board had been a deliberate breach of duty by the defendants, and in such circumstances the breach was unlikely to be discovered for some time. As a result, he argued the limitation period began when he became aware of the meeting.

In a judgement delivered earlier this month, Mr Justice Hellman wrote: “The department’s role was to provide administrative support to the board. A discussion with the board about amending the terms of reference lay beyond its remit. The discussion having taken place, the board should have informed the parties to the hearing of the fact of the discussion and of what was said. This does not appear to have happened.”

While Mr Justice Hellman said there was no evidence before him to infer that either defendant was involved in the meeting or what they said, but if there had been a deliberate breach of duty it was unlikely to be discovered for some time.

“As it is not clear whether the allegation of meeting and improperly advising the board is time-barred, I decline to strike it out at this stage,” the judge wrote.

Mr Justice Hellman also struck out a claim that Mr Darrell was denied a fair hearing as guaranteed by the constitution as “frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process” as drafted, but noted there could be a real ground for claim — that the mechanism in place under the 1981 Act failed to provide him with a fair hearing of his racial discrimination complaint against the bank.

“The appropriate respondent to such a complaint would be the Minister responsible for the administration of the mechanism under the 1981 Act,” he wrote.

“I express no views as to the merits of such a claim. Indeed I can anticipate various objections to it. However it appears to me to capture the essence of Mr Darrell’s grievance concerning his complaint to the commission and the subsequent hearing before the board.”