Dear Sir,

Some observers say the issue is not simply whether the Trinity DNA review reached the correct conclusions but whether the reasoning behind those conclusions can be understood by those affected.

When the Privy Council identified flawed forensic evidence and prompted a review of hundreds of convictions, the expectation was that the process would reinforce confidence in the justice system. Yet where individuals must pursue court proceedings simply to obtain information about how their own case was assessed, questions naturally arise about transparency.

In matters touching on potential miscarriages of justice, the long-standing principle that “justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done” inevitably becomes part of the public discussion.

One aspect of the Trinity DNA review that may attract legal and public interest concerns the description of the review process provided to the Privy Council in 2024, compared with the methodology later described by the Director of Public Prosecutions when the review concluded.

In the Privy Council judgment in Washington v The King (2024), the board recorded that once Trinity-related convictions had been identified:

• Affected individuals would be informed

• They could make submissions

• They could instruct their own expert

• The independent expert’s report would be disclosed to them

However, the later public statement issued by the DPP when the review concluded described a somewhat different process. According to that statement, cases were first assessed by reviewing the evidence without reference to the Trinity DNA evidence, and only where it was concluded that a conviction might not have been secured without the DNA evidence was the case referred to the independent expert.

The practical consequence of this approach is that not every Trinity case was referred to the independent expert.

That difference in emphasis does not necessarily mean the review was conducted improperly. Prosecutorial authorities often retain discretion in how internal reviews are structured. However, it does raise an understandable question about whether the review ultimately carried out corresponds to the process that appeared to be described to the Privy Council when the systemic issue first came to light.

In public law terms, that question intersects with the doctrine of legitimate expectation, which arises when individuals reasonably rely on representations made by public authorities about how a process will operate.

Ultimately, the courts — rather than commentators — will determine whether any such expectation arose and whether the review was conducted in a manner consistent with administrative fairness.

What is clear is that when a forensic failure requires the re-examination of hundreds of convictions, the clarity and transparency of the review process itself become central to maintaining confidence in the justice system.

PHILIP SWIFT

Former DC 217 Bermuda Police

Kent, England